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Abstract
Whilst discussion rages on the issues relating to security of medical data and the reason why it is important, there
is little published information on how to tackle even basic security challenges for medical practice in Australia.
Research suggests an underestimation of the threats to medical data by medical practitioners, hence there is
sufficient reason to promote development of tools to assist medical practice with technical issues they are
unfamiliar with. This paper provides an initial dialogue on how these security issues should be addressed.
Included is a framework for risk assessment and elaboration of the implementation process to make medical data
in Australia secure.
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INTRODUCTION
As more data is held electronically it becomes easier to copy and disseminate. This is one of the positive aspects
of our information age; however, this has security repercussions particularly in the medical field. The once sacred
trust between patients and doctors now requires more consideration if confidentiality is to be maintained. A
consequence of the use of communications technology and by association, a perceived eroding of confidentiality,
has seen medical ethics guidelines revised, stressing the protection of patient-doctor confidentiality. Yet, still
more reflection is necessary in view of the possible legal implications (Pati, 2004). This is only one issue of
security that Australian medicine is now faced with. Another issue is that of data protection. Frighteningly, in an
Australian survey undertaken in 2002 (Holzer & Herrmann, 2002), only 84% of practices that used a computer
system backed up their data. Of these only 76% retain a backup offsite and only 46% have had the backup tested.
Only half of practices had any sort of power filter or battery backup or disaster plan, whilst alarmingly barely one
third has any determination method for detection of unauthorised external access. All respondents’ listed network
or software application password access control as the only method of data security. On average only 50% had
policies covering use of security, yet all with computers had Internet connections. This indicates an alarming
underestimation of the threats to medical data by the medical practitioners.
This paper follows on from discussion on the threats of security to medical data (Williams, 2005a), to elaborate
on the practical side of security for medical practitioners in terms of risk assessment. These threats to medical
data relate to confidentiality and privacy (authorised accessibility), integrity and misuse (authorised
modification), and availability (authorised accessibility when required). The next step in the security of medical
data is to assess the risks the data is subjected to. Risk assessment is a term commonly used in medicine and
more in specifically public health. It refers to “The qualitative or quantitative estimation of the likelihood of
adverse effects that may result from exposure to specified health hazards or from the absence of beneficial
influences” (Last, 1988, p.93). From a computer security viewpoint this definition is similar where risk
assessment “assigns levels of risk to various threats to the network security by comparing the nature of the threats
to the controls designed to reduce them” (Dennis, 2002, p.308).
Whilst there exist academic frameworks for risk assessment in specific situations such as Telemedicine
(Stamatiou et al., 2002), there is little non-technical guidance for medical practitioners and staff responsible for
security of medical data. The overall process for security of medical data should include:
•risk assessment to obtain an overview of the anticipated threats and risks to data;
•development of policies and procedures for those responsible for security, and other staff, to follow; and
•implementation of protection measures appropriate to the environment.
In the development of risk assessment and the resulting protection procedures, it is important to recognise the
different levels of security threats each medical provider is open to, as these may differ for each practice or
hospital (Panko, 2003). This paper discusses the processes involved in risk assessment and how these can be
implemented in practice. It also considers some aspects of protection that should be considered for an
environment where technical expertise may not be readily available.

ASSESSING RISKS
The Risk Assessment Process
For any organisation, risk assessment is an important security measure. The old saying that ‘you cannot manage
what you cannot measure’ is never truer than in the sphere of security. The nature of medicine is such that much
of the patient data recorded is not ‘mission critical’. The data retained in a primary care environment is used
primarily in the management of chronic disease and to assess potential health risk. The majority of this
information is historical but may be used on a regular or episodic basis during clinical consultations. In contrast,
the nature of medical data is not the same for data collected in an emergency department, where it is used in situ
and rarely accessed subsequently. Therefore, the context in which the data is being used is important to assessing
a risk. Additionally, there is a business perspective for medical practitioners who are responsible for the financial
wellbeing of the practice. Thus, risk assessment is contextual and whilst the process can be generalised, the
application of it cannot.
A simplification of the risk assessment process is given in figure 1. Firstly, identification of the information
critical to the practise of medicine and information critical to the business is required. In security terms these are
referred to as ‘assets’. The assets must be considered in terms of the three essential elements of security:
confidentiality, integrity and availability (Tomes, 2005). It must also judge the impact any loss of protection
would result in (Lewis, 2003). The process of risk assessment begins with cataloguing the assets (in this case the
financial and patient data); identifying the potential threats to these assets; and recording the protection methods
available. The protection should be considered in terms of preventative measures, detective measure and
corrective measures. Next, a matching of the data assets to the potential threats is undertaken, producing an
identification of risks. Following this, an assessment of the level of risk to an asset must be made. The level of
risk is derived by reflection on the impact the threat would have were it successful, against the possibility of its
occurrence. Next, a correlation of the level of risk of a threat to an asset must be made. This is to gain an
understanding of the vulnerability of that asset. Lastly, possible control measures can be assigned to each
threat/asset combination. In any assessment of risk and development of controls, the overriding commonsense
approach should be taken, in that only those risks that can be reasonably anticipated need to be subject of the
controls (Tomes, 2005).
Full documentation on the controls and procedures should be up to date and retained as part of the intellectual
property of the institution or practice. For instance, the methods of electronic data transmission protection should
be recorded as the guidelines for such transmissions where they exist do not specify a particular method or
standard (Gilkes, Casimiro, McEvoy, MacFarlane, & Kitchen, 2003). The type of information being shared and
its method of transmission must both be considered.
Details on the type of threats to consider and what controls are available are context specific. For instance, the
Royal, Australian College of General Practitioners (RACGP), General Practice Computing Group has recently
published a set of guidelines intended for general practitioners on the security issues of data (Schattner, 2005).
The intended use is for those with little technical knowledge. The guidelines are the first of their kind specifically
for medical practitioners who need to protect both their business data and their patient records. The checklist
covers the basics of computer security measures as the “10-item IT security guidelines”:
•Responsibility for security issues;
•Established policies and procedures;
•Access control;
•Disaster recovery
•Consulting room and front desk security
•Backup
•Viruses
•Firewalls
•Network maintenance
•Security electronic communication (Schattner, 2005, p.5).
The guidelines themselves indicate (from a security viewpoint) the fundamental nature of the security measures
suggested. The increased use of electronic communication will require more complex measures. Security of
electronic communications together with the use of firewalls will covers some hazards of Internet use, however,
unless there is a thorough understanding of the potential threats, the use of these security measures may not be
sufficient.
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Figure 1: The risk assessment process.

Implementation of the Process
To make the process of risk assessment fit the intended environment, it is useful to draw parallels between
security risk assessment and medical risk assessment. In view of the fact that it is unlikely that most primary
health care providers will have access to security expertise, this approach may assist those responsible for the
management of data security in clinical practice.
1. Identify information
The first step is to identify the electronic data to be protected. It is important to classify critical data and noncritical data. The classification can be by database, or more commonly by application. It should include the
patient data; financial data; reference material; practice management and clerical information retained by the
practice. Further, the software that is used to run the applications should be identified. Lastly, the physical
hardware needs to be recorded, for instance servers, printers, and PCs, as the software cannot run without the
hardware! Also, the expectations and requirements for data availability must be calculated as a benchmark to
ascertain what level of security risk and failure the practice can sustain.
2. Identify threats and controls
This activity consists of identifying responsibilities, threats, and protection methods. It is essential that allocation
of responsibility for security should be assigned. Next, identification of the threats should be undertaken. Good
examples of the potential data and computer threats can be found in texts such as Dennis (2002. p.305).
However, for the medical environment these should be identified with the issues of confidentiality, privacy,
integrity and availability in mind. For instance, the interception and unauthorised access to information are
important issues. Patient identifiable data is now regularly sent electronically to the Australian Health Insurance
Commission by general practices to claim payment for services (Medclaims). The control method for this is the
Australian Government public key infrastructure (PKI) encryption. Another example in the day to day running of
a medical practice is access control, which can be a significant concern. Access control is mainly managed by
password authentication. If authentication is to be effective, it needs to be consistent with a role-based level
approach. Normal passwords chosen by users are a high risk authentication technique. Unfortunately, the use of
smartcards and biometrics is not yet commonplace. In addition, the type of technology becoming popular in the

medical environment, due to the demand for increasing mobility, like personal digital assistants (PDA), creates
added interception and synchronisation issues. Unlike the US’s Health Information Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), which specifies strict regulation on wireless data protection, Australia has no such
data security compliance regulations (Veltman, 2003; Williams, 2005b). Integrity and error correction of data can
also be problematic. Meredith (2005) cites examples in the UK where patient information is regularly checked by
the patient themselves. This technique has been proven to assist not only in the accuracy of the data but has
improved the quality of the consultations and understanding by the patient of their treatment. This can be
considered an effective control measure.
Lastly, in identifying threats and control, protection measures must can be named and classified into preventive,
detective and correction methods. For this task research into available methods may be required. Useful but less
technical information can be gained from sources such as the GPCG (RACGP, 2005; Schattner, 2005). A major
factor for this and any protection method is policy and procedures management.
3. Matching threats to data assets
Matching the information and threats will result in a matrix of potential risks. This is essential to gain an overall
picture of the security issues facing the practice.
4. Assessing level of risk
A level of risk has to be assessed in light of the protection currently in place and the impact the threat would have
if successful. Assigning such risks (relative risks) is not uncommon in clinical diagnosis and management of
disease. It forms part of the clinical decision making processes of medical practitioners and is used in methods
such as clinical decision analysis. The statistical assignment of risks is not an exact science; it is the process of
assigning a likelihood of the event occurring given the controls in place. Relative risk in medicine is represented
as the incidence of a disease among those exposed over the incidence in those not exposed (Barker & Rose,
1984). In security the equation is similar in that it is assessed as the occurrence of the event given the control
measures over the occurrence without the control measure (CQU Computer Security Committee, 1996). In
computer security this risk is assigned as low, moderate or high, rather than a statistical result.
5. Correlating information, level of risk and protection
The correlation of the data to be protected, its potential risks, and the control measures that can be used can be a
complicated exercise but is an essential one. This activity will allow a full picture of the vulnerability of the
practice to be created. As part of this step, disaster recovery plans should be developed.
6. Assessing current protection
Finally, a review of the measures currently in place must be performed. This allows effective decisions to be
made, and actions taken to improve the security and protection of the medical data. As an example, many
common security problems can be assisted by education. Many healthcare professionals are unclear about the
details, or even the existence, of privacy and data protection laws or what they mean in practice (Meredith,
2005). Strobl (2000) lists a misunderstanding and perplexity over the interpretation of data protection acts as a
major contributor to the confusion decision makers are forced to face when managing patient data. Another
common problem is power security. Electrical protection can be easily afforded by using an uninterruptible
power supply (UPS). The device allows time to complete current work and facilitate correct close-down
procedures (another susceptibility of data to loss through incorrect switching off procedures). A UPS can be a
cost-effective and cost-avoidance measure in security (Appelt, 2005). There are many such straightforward
measures that can be put into practice.

CONCLUSION: FUTURE CONERNS
The approach taken to risk assessment and security is important. Gilkes et al (2003, p.427) suggest that data
protection is “the balance between facilitating important research and audit, and protecting patient
confidentiality”. They describe a situation where a patient information database has ‘medium’ security. In this
case medium is translated as the data being held on a specific computer hard drive, where the logon and database
are password protected. In terms of the potential risks this ‘medium’ definition of security it sadly inadequate.
The emphasis has been placed on meeting legal requirements rather than assessing the inherent risks in both
recording, retaining and using such information. Perhaps some of the responsibility lays with the providers of the
health records systems themselves, in that accountability for security should be part of the IT development
process. The changing nature of how we use electronic health information needs to be addressed at a root level
during the construction of clinical IT systems.
As discussed widely in the literature, the lack of government policy and legal protection in Australia is of
concern (ICTSC, 2004; Williams, 2005b). However, this should not prevent clinical practitioners from taking
seriously the responsibility for protection of medical data. Ultimately, they may be required to meet strict

security and data protection standards similar to those in place in the US under the HIPAA (Department of
Health and Human Services, 2003). The implementation of such guidelines can be characterised by the report
recently that a US medical centre has moved from the traditional password and user identification security to a
new biometric system. Driven by the need to meet the increasingly demanding legislation in the US, medical
practices are increasingly turning to biometric security (Dalton, 2004). Whilst Australia is a long way off from
the restrictions of the HIPAA legislation, action taken now will certainly alleviate the pain of risk assessment
when it ultimately comes into force.
The technological advances made in clinical medicine are paralleled by the advances in computing and
communications. “Integrated electronic health records are increasingly seen as the way to achieve quality and
continuity in treatment, fill the gaps in public health research and contain costs” (Carter, 2000). The internet is
becoming a viable alternative to data transfer between health care providers over other forms of communication.
The security issues in using a public network must be seriously considered. Security policy and awareness are the
keys to good protection, in addition to monitoring and audit controls. For areas were patient data cannot be
adequately restricted in a network then encryption should be considered (Jones, 1998).
A lack of recognition of the issues involved in computerized databases and basic security measure indicates a
dangerous gap in the security of medical data. Whilst the Australian government has set up the Health
Information Council whose terms of reference include privacy and security of data, it has fallen to the
professional bodies, like the RACGP to devise basic guidelines. There is a clear need for assistance to medical
practices to secure their data. This includes understanding the issues of security and performing risk assessment,
as the first steps in acknowledgment of the safety and importance of security of medical data.
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